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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
but the interest of all will be properly protected and main-
tained."'
The Faber case, quoted from in the Evans case should be
carefully read before applying Section 10-205.
APPELLATE PRAOTICE
This subject covers a wide field and it is suggested to young
practitioners that they read carefully Title 7, Vol. 1 of the
1952 Code from page 355 through page 401. Since appeal now
is mostly statutory in this State, to be familiar with the fore-
going provisions gives one a practical foundation for appellate
work. At the same time a thorough checking of the annota-
tions thereunder must not be lost sight of and every Section
should be brought up-to-date by reference to the latest Code
Supplement.
However, it should be noted that in dealing with any par-
ticular tribunal one cannot safely go by the Sections included
in Title 7, Vol. 1, since the legislature in some other Section
relating to a particular tribunal may have entirely changed
the course of appealing. Take for example Sections 7-341
to 7-344, which provide for the right of appeal from a county
court to the circuit court. That Section is applicable generally
to county courts unless a special provision as to the right of
appeal is found in one of the Sections establishing a particular
county court. Such Sections exist and take the place of Sec-
tions 7-341 to 7-344. For example, Sections 15-779 and 15-830
provide, respectively, that the right of appeal from the Rich-
land and Spartanburg County Courts shall be direct to the
Supreme. All the Sections relating to other county courts
must be carefully checked as to the right of appeal, just like
each such court must be checked as to its jurisdiction, entry
of its judgments and various other phases or steps that can
seriously affect the rights of one's client.
It is also very important to know Rules of the Supreme
Court 1 to 29 and 33, and to be familiar with the annotations
thereunder. Each Supplement to Vol. 7 of the Code relative
to such Rules should always be checked carefully to see if
any changes have been made and also that one may become
familiar with the up-to-date annotations construing and ap-
plying the rules.
[Vol. 11
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It should be noted that not only Rules of the Supreme Court
b't also Rules 49 and 50 of the Circuit Court come into the
aplellate picture. The syllabus in State v. Cottingham (1953),
224 S. C. 181, 77 S. E. 2d 897, gives one a clear idea of what
is now necessary to properly get an appeal before ihe Supreme
Court. There one finds as follows:
Where solicitor's affidavit, declaring that transcript
of record for appeal had not been timely filed, was before
trial court on motion to dismiss, and transcript of trial
had never been requested by appellants of official ste-
nographer, dismissal of appeal was proper, even in ab-
sence of certificate of clerk that transcript of record for
appeal had not been filed. Code 1952, §§ 7-401 et seq.,
7-409; Rules of Supreme Court, rule 1 et seq.; Rules of
Practice for Circuit Court, rules 49, 50.
That case clears away the fog that existed prior thereto
as to whose function it is to dismiss an appeal which has not
been timely perfected and filed and also that four days notice
is now all that is necessary instead of the former time limit
of ten days. One who is preparing an appeal should read the
case thoroughly.
What is Appealable? The common law allowed no review
by a higher court via writ of error unless a judgment was
final. An interlocutory judgment - one that only finally de-
cided a certain phase of a case - was not reviewable. That
has now been changed by statute or rule of court in many
jurisdictions, one of which is South Carolina Section 15-123
which provides for 4 kinds of intermediate or interlocutory
judgments from which an appeal may be taken. As to what
these are, five pages of annotations fully cover the subject,
and should be carefully read.
The rule in South Carolina used to be as shown by Hamer
v. Hillcrest Land Co. (1932), 165 S. C. 298, 163 S. E. 727,
wherein it was held: "'... that there could be no appeal from
a verdict merely; that there must be a judgment."' That was
the law in this State until Section 7-5 was passed in 1934.
That Section allows an appeal to be taken from a verdict
though there is no judgment based thereon. In McCants v. W.
Va. Pulp etc. Co. (1953), 223 S. C. 467, 76 S. E. 2d 614, one
finds the following at page 469:
Appellant cites and relies upon decisions which were
rendered before enactment of the present Sec. 7-5 of the
171
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Code of 1952. Under it, if the order of the Court of Com-
mon Pleas should be likened to a verdict, it was at once
appealable and, having served notice of appeal to this
court, appellant was bound to proceed upon the schedule
which is fixed by the statutes governing such appeals.
The following helpful quotation is from the opinion in
Spartan Mills v. Law, 186 S. C. 61, 194 S. E. 653, 655:
"This appeal is from a decree in equity and is a final de-
termination of the rights of the parties. The decree of
Judge Sease orders judgment for the respondents, which
decree is a judgment. 'The judgment issues from the
court not from the attorneys or the clerk.' Clark v. Mel-
ton, 19 S. C. 498. As stated in the Sherbert case, [Sher-
bert v. School District], supra [169 S. C. 191, 168 S. E.
391], respondent's point is more technical than substan-
tial. Supreme Court rule 4, par. 3, provides that the 'na-
ture of the order of judgment appealed from' should be
set forth, but the rule does not provide that the entry
of the judgment is required. Nor does section 781, Code
of Laws of 1932 [now Section 7-405], require the entry
of the judgment, but only refers to 'an order, decree or
judgment granted or rendered.' The entry of a judgment
is merely a ministerial act and for the purposes of notice,
lien, and enforcement."
Attention is also called to the fact that statutory appeal
such as exists in American jurisdictions, including South
Carolina, is entirely different from appeal in the old English
set-up, which was of civil law origin. Then it was a review
only in equity and the cause was heard on its merits de novo,
i.e., evidence was taken and the appellate court decided all
factual issues again; in other words the cause was tried
de novo.
Statutory, or code appeal as it is sometimes called, provides
for review in both law and equity cases. In a law case, like
the old common law writ of error, appeal now is only for cor-
recting errors of law. It also provides for review of an equity
case but with a modification of old equity appeal, in that,
though the appellate tribunal can pass on issues of fact as
well as law, and reverse findings of the chancellor, it cannot
re-try the cause on the merits by having evidence adduced
before it, i.e., it does not try it over again.
172 [Vol. II
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Statutory A'ppeal in Equity Case: It should also be noted
that the South Carolina Supreme Court cannot even review
findings of fact in equity cases when, under Section 10-1457,
issues have been submitted to a jury under Circuit Rule 28,
not for mere enlightenment of the court, but for their deter-
mination, and their verdict has not been set aside. See also
Art. 5, Section 4 of the Constitution of 1895. When it has not
been set aside, the appellate review is then like that in a law
case and only errors of law can be considered. Section 15-122.
Under Sections 10-1057 and 10-1457, when applied in con-
nection with Circuit Court Rule 28 and Art. 5, Section 4 of
the 1895 Constitution, one should be familiar with the decision
in Johnstone v'. Matthews (1937), 183 S. C. 360, 191 S. E.
223, and also In re Nightingale's Estate (1937), 182 S. C.
527, 189 S. E. 890. As said in the Johnstone case at page 366:
But we are of opinion, and so hold, that the provision
of Section 593 of the Code as to the force of the verdict,
here relied on by the appellants, can only mean under the
plain language used, that when issues of fact in equity
cases are framed under that section to be tried by a jury,
and such issues are submitted to them and findings there-
on are made by them under the statute, such findings,
if there is any evidence to support them, are conclusive
of the issues submitted; and the presiding Judge, in such
case, can only affirm the verdict or set it aside and order
a new trial. In his discretion, however, he may, during
the course of the trial, and before such findings are made,
withdraw the case from the jury and decide the issues for
himself; or, instead of withdrawing them, he may have
the jury, should he so desire, to make findings upon the
issues as framed for his aid and enlightenment in de-
termining the judgment to be rendered. And this last is
what Judge Rice here did. The defendants made a mo-
tion, before and at the conclusion of the testimony, that
the Judge withdraw the case from the jury, on the ground
of entire failure of proof by the plaintiffs, and write an
order sustaining the validity of the mortgage and dismiss-
ing the complaint. He declined to do this, but stated, in
substance and effect, that he would submit the case to
the jury for the information of the Court, and that he
would not be bound by their verdict. Also, in his charge
to the jury, he indicated to them that their findings on
4
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the issues submitted would be merely to assist him in
arriving at the truth, but that the decree of the Court
would declare what the truth was. Clearly, as we have
said, Judge Rice, instead of withdrawing the case from
the jury, as in his discretion he could have done, had them
to make findings upon the issues before them merely for
the enlightenment of his conscience. This he could do.
There was no error, therefore, in his refusal to accept
their findings and in rendering judgment contrary
thereto.
Where, however, issues are submitted to a jury for their
final decision and not for the enlightenment of the chancellor,
their decision or verdict is conclusive as in a law case and
an appeal to the Supreme Court can be only on errors of law
and not on the facts.
And Young v. Levy (1945), 206 S. C. 1, 32 S. E. 2d 889,
leaves no doubt as to the applicable rule. At page 11 Justice
Stukes declared:
I do not question the authority of Alderman v. Alder-
man, 178 S. C., 9, 181 S. E., 897, 105 A. L. R., 102, upon
the point of the propriety of the rule there stated and ap-
plied, to wit, that concurrent factual findings of the mas-
ter and trial Judge in an equity case will not be disturbed
upon appeal unless they are without evidence to support
them or are against the clear preponderance of the evi-
dence. It is a coincidence that I was of counsel in that
case and argued for the rule which was already well es-
tablished by prior decisions. The case has since been
cited too many times to admit doubt of its authority. But
this rule of the decisions ("court-made law") should not
be so construed as to conflict with the constitutional pow-
ers and duties of this Court. The latter are set forth in
considerable detail in our Constitution of 1895, Art. 5,
and I quote in part Section 4: "And said Court shall have
appellate jurisdiction only in cases of chancery, and in
such appeals they shall review the findings of fact as
well as the law, except in chancery cases where the facts
are settled by a jury and the verdict not set aside, and
shall constitute a Court for the correction of errors at
law under such regulations as the General Assembly may
by law prescribe."
[Vol. 11
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In South Carolina a foreclosure decree usually settles all
the rights of the parties and leaves nothing to be done but to
make a sale and dispose of the proceeds in accordance with
the decree. The sale is the execution of the decree and there-
fore only a ministerial act. The right of review exists when
the decree is signed.
Record in Clerk's Office should Always Show Jurisdiction
of a Limited Court: However, it should be noted that, in the
final disposition of a foreclosure action, it is best that the
record in the clerk's office be completed and should always
show the final disposition of the cause under the decree, and
hence the careful practitioner will get the chancellor, now re-
ferred to as judge, to sign an order confirming the sale and
disposition of the proceeds. This is then filed with the clerk.
and becomes a part of the record in the clerk's office. This
would also apply in claim and delivery actions, where the
value of personal property can affect jurisdiction. This would
be especially true of county courts; as is shown, for example,
by Sections 15-654 and 15-764.
In this connection another sugestion can save future trou-
ble. In cases involving land and the value thereof, courts
of limited jurisdiction, such as county courts, have value limi-
tations under which their jurisdiction, or power to hear and
determine, depends. So that there will be no doubt in the
record in the clerk's office, one should always see to it that
such value is established the very first thing in the trial and
that the judge signs an order stating the value, so that there
will be something which can go to the clerk's office to get on
the journal or minutes of the court, since nothing in the ste-
nographer's notes ever goes to that office.
The writer recalls a foreclosure case in the early days of
the Richland County Court in which the judge noticed that
the mortgage debt was $2700. The jurisdiction of the court
couldn't then exceed $3000. He at once asked for evidence as
to value of the mortgaged land. It was very conflicting, rang-
ing from $2500 to $3400. He decided that it was not over
$3000, dictating his decision to the court stenographer but
signing no order to that effect, as neither attorney presented
any such order for his signature. The case was then referred
to the Master. A decree was finally signed and the land sold to
satisfy the debt.
6
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Three years thereafter a prospective purchaser of the land,
through his attorney, turned down the title on the ground that
the foreclosure deed was void because the land at that time
was worth over $3000 and therefore the court had no juris-
diction. The court stenographer had destroyed his notes;
there was no order signed by the judge on record in the clerk's
office, so the matter was open to the vagaries of human testi-
mony, since at most there was only the probability that there
existed a prima facie presumption that a court of limited
jurisdiction had the power of foreclosure over that particular
piece of land.
There is a conflict of authority in America as to whether
there is such a prima facie presumption, or, if there is,
whether it becomes conclusive if the record doesn't show a
lack of jurisdiction. 21 C. J. S., pages 149 to 154. See Alloqui
v. Duran, (Tex.), 60 S. W. (2) 808. South Carolina has not
directly decided the question, but Moore v. Moore (1938),
187 S. C. 144, 197 S. E. 507, leads one to the conclusion
that, if the point is raised during the trial, the record had
better show what the decision was, especially if it be in favor
of the court's jurisdiction.
Fortunately, however, in the instant case, the attorneys
agreed that if the judge would sign an affidavit that at the
time of foreclosure he had, upon evidence taken in court, de-
cided the land was valued at not over $3,000, the title would
be passed. The affidavit was signed and the sale went through
but look at what the result might have been, had the attorneys
not agreed as they did, in view of another attorney's over-
sight 3 years previously.
What Orders are Reviewable and What are Not: Here one
finds either statutes or rules of court functioning, and also a
resulting conflict of authority in interpreting and applying the
same. With regard to Section 15-123 of the Code, the differ-
ences are such that the only safe course is to check the annota-
tions thereunder. One finds that an order involving the merits
is really one affecting a substantial right and vice versa.
Blakely and Copeland v. Frazier, 11 S. C. 123 (1877), and
Henderson v. Wyatt (1876), 8 S. C. 112.
As pointed out in the Blakely case, supra, beginning at page
134:
The jurisdiction of this court extends to all appeals
from intermediate orders and final judgments in actions
[Vol. II
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where such order or judgment involves the merits. 15
Stat. 868. An order involving merely the exercise of dis-
cretion on the part of the court making it is not appeal-
able, as error of law cannot be alleged as against such an
order. 1 Wait Prac. 465. When, however, the order af-
fects a substantial right, necessarily affecting the judg-
ment, it must be regarded as involving the merits. The
term "merits" is not very clearly defined. It certainly
embraces more than the questions of law and fact, con-
stituting the cause of action or defence. As it regards
the principles of construction, the necessary means of
attaining an end stand upon the same ground of privilege
as the end itself. If, then, a party is entitled to an appeal
as a means of securing a proper judgment, he is pre-
sumably entitled to such appeal, in order to secure that
without which the judgment could not be rightfully
had. The word "merits" naturally bears the sense of in-
cluding all that the party may claim of right in reference
to his case. Nor is any authority brought to notice that
limits the sense to any particular class of rights among
those that have a tendency to control the results of cases.
The expression "affecting the judgment," employed by
the statute (15 Stat. 868) must be regarded as equiva-
lent, in the sense of that statute, to the other expression,
"involving the merits," as defining the cases to which
that jurisdiction shall extend. They must be regarded
as different definitions of the same case. In Section 11
of the code, as it originally stood, the expression was,
"involving the merits and necessarily affecting the judg-
ment." As that section now stands, the review of judg-
ments, and intermediate orders upon direct appeal from
such judgments or orders, extends to all cases "involving
the merits," the other words being omitted, while as it
regards intermediate orders, brought up for review by
an appeal from the final judgment, the expression em-
ployed to limit the jurisdiction is "necessarily affecting
the judgment," omitting the words "involving the mer-
its." It is evident that the words "involving the merits,"
is used in its large significance in the original text of the
code, as appears from the character of the terms limiting
it to cases where the judgment was necessarily affected.
On the other hand, in the amendment of 1873, this limi-
8
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tation is dispepsed with, presumably as unnecessary, and
the terms there employed are treated as equivalents.
Whatever can be regarded as affecting the necessary
means of obtaining a judgment, must be regarded as af-
fecting the necessary means of obtaining a judgment,
must be regarded as affecting the judgment itself.
It may be concluded from the foregoing that whenever
a substantial right of the party to an action material to
obtaining a judgment in such action is denied, a right
of appeal lies to this court. Prior to the recent amend-
ment of the code relating to the place of trial, the de-
fendant could not, as matter of right, claim that a trial
should be had in the county of his residence. In those
cases where the venue was not fixed by the nature of the
cause of action itself, it was the right of the plaintiff
to select the place of trial, subject only to the limitation
that such place of trial must, when any of the parties
reside within the state, be in some county where one or
more of such parties, either plaintiff or defendant, re-
sides. If the defendant desired to effect a change, it
could only be obtained by the order of the court on the
grounds specified by law. It is evident that under the
law as it now stands, the defendant may claim of right
that the trial should be had in the county where he re-
sides, in cases of the class to which the present belongs.
If, then, it is material to his defence that the jury, con-
vened to try his case, should be drawn, summoned and
empaneled in the manner prescribed by law, so that the
denial of right, in this respect, entitles him to an appeal,
it is manifest that to change it from a vicinage other
than that designated by law, is an error in a matter in-
volving a substantial right material to his defence, and
thereby necessarily affecting the judgment. The con-
clusion reached renders a new trial necessary.
So, the application of Section 15-123 resolves itself into
case law, and if one doesn't check the cases to date he is liable
to go astray. For example, one will find that an order strik-
ing a portion of a pleading is appealable. Miles v. Charleston
Light and Water Co. (1909), 87 S. C. 254, 69 S. E. 292;
whereas an order refusing to strike out a pleading or a part
thereof is not appealable. Cooper v. A. C. L. Ry. Co. (1905),
78 S. C. 562, 59 S. E. 704.
[Vol. 11L
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Discretionary Orders: Some authorities, as for example
Sunderland in his TRIAL & APPELLATE PRACTICE, 2nd
Ed., class involuntary nonsuit and direction of verdict among
discretionary orders. This is a grave mistake, since any such
order turns not on any factual issue but solely on a matter
of law, and as to the latter, a judge has no discretion. If he
did have that power, a judge could change even basic law at
will with resulting chaos to society.
In South Carolina a voluntary nonsuit, which doesn't in-
volve purely a matter of law is, as heretofore stated, a matter
of discretion. In a number of South Carolina cases one is
told that a judge is to exercise discretion, but in no case
is there given anything by which to measure that discretion.
A clear case with a definite yardstick on the subject is Bailey
v. Taffe (1866), 29 Cal. 422, which says:
The discretion intended, however, is not a capricious or
arbitrary discretion, but an impartial discretion, guided
and controlled in its exercise by fixed legal principles.
It is not a mental discretion, to be exercised ex gratia,
but a legal discretion, to be exercised in conformity with
the spirit of the law, and in a manner to subserve and
not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice.
In a plain case this discretion has no office to perform,
and its exercise is limited to doubtful cases, where an
impartial mind hesitates. If it be doubted whether the
excuse offered is sufficient or not, or whether the de-
fense set up is with or without merit in foro legis, when
examined under those rules of law by which Judges are
guided to a conclusion, the judgment of the Court below
will not be disturbed. If, on the contrary, we are satis-
fied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Court below has
come to an erroneous conclusion, the party complaining
of the error is as much entitled to a reversal in a case
like the present as in any other.
See Miller et al v. Gulf Ins. Co. (1925), 132 S. C. 78, 129
S. E. 131, for a full discussion of "abuse of discretion." As
that case at page 82 will show, the writer as a young judge
was taught a salutary lesson he never forgot:
In the discussion of the matter of the "abuse of dis-
cretion" by the presiding Judge in this case, it must be
understood that the Court is guided by the principle an-
10
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nounced in Norris v. Clinkscales, 47 S. C. 488; 25 S. E.,
797:
"And the appeal will lie, not because of any so-called
'abuse of discretion' - a phrase unhappily framed, be-
cause implying a bad motive or wrong purpose - but be-
cause his ruling may appear to have been made on
grounds and for reasons clearly untenable."
The motion to have the sheriff made a party defendant
was, under the circumstances, so just and reasonable that
it should have been granted unless it appeared to the
trial Judge, in the exercise of his discretion, that some
good reason existed for refusing it. The sheriff was the
principal obligor upon the bond. The plaintiffs' cause of
action was based upon his alleged negligence and mis-
management; no one was better qualified to explain the
doubtful circumstances of the transaction than the sher-
iff. The surety company, upon payment of the plain-
tiffs' demand, would be entitled to indemnity from the
sheriff; it could not possibly be detrimental to the inter-
ests of the plaintiffs, if entitled to recover, to have a
judgment against two rather than one. It would be a
serious detriment to the surety company, sued alone, to
have to pay the judgment and then institute an action
against the sheriff for indemnity in his own county. It
is in the line of public policy that all differences between
interested parties be adjusted in the one litigation.
And further on page 83 the Court continued:
The only explanation, we do not consider it a reason,
which the trial Judge gave for his refusal, was that "it
was not necessary or desirable" that the sheriff be made
a party. Granting that he was not a necessary party, that
it was not necessary, why was it not desirable? He gives
no reason for this conclusion; we do not see how it was
possible for him to have done so. If no reason appears to
support the exercise of a judicial discretion, the Court's
action was necessarily arbitrary; if arbitrary it was tech-
nically an abuse of discretion.
Furthermore, the decision of the case, with the sheriff a
party, would asure against the reproach which would
most probably result from a verdict against the insur-
ance company in Richland County and a verdict in favor
of the sheriff in Florence County, both based upon the
[Vol. 11
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identical charge of mismanagement on the part of the
sheriff.
It occurs to us that every conceivable ground was pres-
ent to induce the conclusion that the bringing in of the
sheriff as a party defendant was just, reasonable, and
in line with the policy of the law "to prevent a multi-
plicity of suits and that there may be a complete and final
decree between all parties interested"; certainly "a con-
summation devoutly to be wished," a desirable result.
Waiver of Right to Review: No citation of authority is
needed for the assertion that no court will hear a moot ques-
tion; not even will the plea for a declaratory judgment be en-
tertained relative to such a question. However, what about
one who pays a judgment waiving a right to appeal? There
is a split of authority with no case in this State. The majority
hold that there is the element of involuntariness in the picture
and hence no waiver because otherwise the judgment can be
collected through force at extra cost and most probably at
a sacrifice of the debtor's property. Cleveland etc. Ry. Co. v.
Nowlin (1904), 163 Ind. 497, 72 N. E. 257. Others hold that
payment is a waiver unless execution has been issued. Cowell
-v. Gregory (1902), 130 N. C. 80, 40 S. E. 849.
As shown by the Nowlin case, supra, an important factor
enters where a public utility pays an award of compensation
for eminent domain to the clerk of court and takes possession
of the property in line with its duty to the public. Since the
use of the property is for the public's benefit and time is usu-
ally of the essence, the utility's right to appeal should not be
considered waived.
Also, a party obeying a writ of mandamus doesn't waive
his right to appeal. State v. Young, 66 S. C. 115. As said in
that case at page 121:
.. The appellants had the right to appeal from the order
of the Circuit Court allowing the writ of mandamus to
issue. Pinckney v. Jones, 2 Strob., 250; Matthews v.
Nance, 49 S. C., 322, 27 S. E., 408. The appeal, however,
did not act as supersedas. Pinekney v. Jones, supra. The
compliance by the appellants with the writ of mandamus
was not voluntary but compulsory, as they would have
subjected themselves to proceedings in contempt if they
had refused to obey the writ. To sustain the contention
12
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of the respondents would practically deny to the appel-
lants the right of appeal.
Jurisdictional Amount: South Carolina doesn't have any
intermediate appellate courts, so the problem of jurisdictional
amount as being decisive of what court has the power of
review doesn't arise. In those jurisdictions where the prob-
lem arises, the definite rule is that only those matters which
are then in dispute are to be considered in determining what
court has reviewable power. 4 C. J. S. 159 and Hilton v. Dick-
inson (1883), 108 U. S. 165, 2 Sup. Ct. 424. It is likewise
generally held that the amount stated .in the complaint and
not the amount stated in the prayer shall govern. This latter
rule is like that used in this State to determine jurisdiction
of a court of limited jurisdiction, such as a county court, as
to whether it has the power to try a particular case. Williams
v. Workman (1920), 113 S. C. 487, 101 S. E. 833. In that
case it was held at page 488:
This is an action for claim and delivery, tried in the
County Court for Richland County. There is only one
question in the case, and that is the question of jurisdic-
tion. The jurisdiction of the County Court is limited to
$3,000. The prayer of the complaint reads:
"Wherefore, the plaintiff demands judgment for the
possession of the automobile above described, for dam-
ages in the sum of twenty-five hundred ($2,500) dollars,
the costs of this action, and such other and further relief
as may be just and proper."
The verdict was for the plaintiff for the possession of
the car or its value, $1,250, if possession could not be
had. The record further shows that on the trial of the
case the plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to the
possession of the automobile in question, or its value,
$1,250, if it could not be had, and damages for each day
it had been retained by the defendant, in the sum of $5
to $10 per day, whichever amount the jury thought
proper. The record does not show the exact time of the
detention, but 60 days is a liberal allowance.
The appellant contends that the plaintiff's claim was
for $2,500 damages and an automobile valued at $1,250,
or $3,750, so that the amount in controversy exceeded
the jurisdiction of the Court by $750. There is no doubt
[Vol. 11
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that the amount in controversy at the trial was well
within the jurisdiction of the County Court. The question
is: Do the complaint and affidavit show that the amount
claimed is in excess of, or fail to show that the case is
within, the limited jurisdiction of the County Court? It
shows neither. It needs no citation of authority to show
that the prayer of the complaint is no part of the com-
plaint....
Right of Appeal or Review of Orders of Administrative Trz-
bunals: In Southern Ry. Co. v. Public Service Commission
(1939), 195 S. C. 247, 10 S. E. 2d 769, the Court said that
technically speaking there can be no appeal, in the strict
sense, from an administrative body to a court, even where a
statute uses the word "appeal"; that it would be a "statutory
right of review." The court said further that section 8254
[now Section 58-124] provided for a review by way of an
action in the Court of Common Pleas, and that, if no "statu-
tory review" was provided for, the administrative body, since
it could not enforce its own orders, must make application
to a court. At such- a hearing there would be indirectly af-
forded a review in that the validity of such order would have
to be judicially determined. And any party aggrieved by
such an administrative order would, of course, have the right
to go to a court for relief. As said at page 254:
It is doubtless true that any right to appeal from
the orders of a public utility commission is founded upon
constitutional or statutory provisions. And even where
the statutes provide for an appeal it is said that the
Court does not, strictly speaking, exercise appellate juris-
diction, since there can be no appeal in the legal sense
from the order of an administrative body. 51 C. J., 70,
71. Hence the provision in Section 8254 for an action
in the Court of Common Pleas for Richland County. But
assuming that there is no statutory authority for any
sort of review of an order of the Public Service Commis-
sion relating to railroads, we are nevertheless of the opin-
ion that the instant action may be maintained. It is
quite clear that the commission is without power to en-
force its own orders, but that application must be made
to the Courts for the enforcement thereof, and this inci-
dentally involves the judicial determination of the validity
of such orders. Likewise we are of opinion that an ag-
14
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grieved party would have the right to apply to the Court
for relief against the threatened or attempted enforce-
ment of an invalid order....
It is to be noted, however, that the court in the above case
had to distinguish City of Columbia v. Tatum et al. (1934),
174 S. C. 366, 177 S. E. 541, because of the legal effect of
Section 58-101, 58-114, and 58-124, the language of which
did not include railroads. In So. Ry. Co. case, which involved
a "public utility" as defined in Section 58-101, the review-
ing tribunal was under the duty of exercising its "own
independent judgment on the questions of both fact and law"
as provided in Section 58-124. Whereas in the Tatum, case a
railroad was involved and therefore Section 58-124 did not
apply and as the Court said in the So. Ry. Co. case, supra:
... And it is our considered judgment that upon a judi-
cial review of an order of the Public Service Commission
relating to railroad companies, of the character now be-
fore us, the true rule is that the commission's findings
of fact are prima facie correct and should not be set aside
unless clearly against the weight of the evidence....
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